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THE DIGNITY OF THE CIVIL JURY
Harry Kalven, Jr.*
Having taken one of the longest and most deliberate looks at the
jury in the history of that institution-as director of the University of Chicago Jury Project-Professor Kalven concludes first that
contemporary criticism centers too largely on some-what extraneous
considerationsand too little on the central issue-the quality of jurymade as opposed to judge-made decisions. After pointing out that
the extraneous issues-particularlythe delay allegedly involved-are less
critical than is widely supposed, he draws on the jury study data to
show that juries are not baffled by the intricate case and do not have
the simple biases with which they are credited or discredited. Rather,
they differ with judges just enough to ",make it interesting" and to
suggest that there is a special brand of "jury equity" which the author
does not here expound in any detail but which he admires.
FEV years ago I had occasion to write a paragraph about the jury
which seems so apt for the purpose of introducing the present
discussion that, rather than attempt a paraphrase, I risk the gracelessness
of opening with a direct quotation from myself.
A

The judge and jury are two remarkably different institutions for
reaching the same objective-fair, impersonal adjudication of controversies. The judge represents tradition, discipline, professional competence and repeated experience with the matter. This is undoubtedly
a good formula. But the endless fascination of the jury is to see
whether something quite different-the layman amateur drawn from
a wide public, disciplined only by the trial process, and by an obligation to reach a group verdict-can somehow work as well or perhaps
better.'
The passage suggests what I hope is the proper stance for discussing
the merits of the jury system. The jury is almost by definition an
exciting and gallant experiment in the conduct of serious human affairs;
it is not surprising that virtually since its inception it has been embroiled
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. A.B. 1935, J.D, 1938, University of Chicago.
1. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST.
L.J. 158, 178 (1958).
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in controversy, attracting at once the most extravagant praise and the
harshest criticism.2 Nor is it surprising that the issue cannot be narrowly
focussed or definitively put to rest.
For the past several years at the University of Chicago Law School
we have been engaged in a major empirical research project dedicated
to discovering facts about contemporary jury behavior.3 The materials
are rich and complex and furnish ammunition for both sides of the
argument; and ideally we should let the systematic reporting of the

research speak for itself in appropriate and balanced detail. Unfortunately, as seems to be the case with most large-scale research projects,
it is taking longer than anticipated to put the results into publishable
book form, and the data most relevant to the civil jury have not as yet
been reported.
I shall therefore attempt no more in the present essay than to offer
certain reflections of my own 4 on the jury and the debate which
surrounds it, documented by a selective sampling of the project

materials.
2. The basic contemporary American criticism is FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949);
careful assessments of the argument by English lawyers, who draw somewhat different
conclusions, are DEVLIN, TRIAL By JURY (1956), and G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT
218-304 (2d ed. 1958). Useful bibliographies are found in JOINER, CIVIL JUSTIcE AND THE
JURY (1962); Broeder, The Functions of the Jury-Facts or Fictions? 21 U. CHI. L.
REV. 386 (1954); Green, Juries and Justice-The Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 152. The most recent criticism has come from two distinguished New
York judges. See Desmond, Should It Take 34 Months for a Trial?, N.Y. Times, Dec.
8, 1963, § 6 (Magazine), p. 29; Peck, Do Juries Delay Justice?, 19 F.R.D. 455 (1956).
Another distinguished New York jurist, Judge Hart, has recently joined the debate
on the side of the jury. See HART, LONG LIVE THE AMERICAN JURY (1964).
3. For various publications to date from the project see ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUcHHOLZ,
DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); Kalven, Report on the Jury Project of the University of
Chicago Law School, in CONFERENcE ON AIMS AND MErHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 155 (U.
Mich. Law School 1957); Strodtbeck, Social Process, The Law and Jury Functioning,in
LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 144 (Evan ed. 1962); Zeisel, Social Research on the Law: The Ideal
and the Practical,in LAW AND SocioLOGY 124 (Evan ed. 1962); Broeder, The University of
Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959); Kalven, The Jury, The Law, and
The Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958); Kalven, A Report
on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 368
(1957). Two further books, ZEISEL & KALVEN, THE JURY, THE JUDGE, AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW and SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY, will be published soon. The
manuscript for the fourth of the project books, ZEIsU., KALVEN, & CALLAHAN, THE JURY,
THE JUDGE, and THE CIVIL CASE, is in process of completion.
4. The project has been an interdisciplinary collaborative effort, and the research to
which I shall be making reference is largely that of my colleagues, in particular
Hans Zeisel, Fred Strodtbeck, and Dale Broeder. Although I am much indebted to them
and to others on the project for the stimulus of innumerable discussions, the views
on the jury herein expressed are my "own.
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I
Classic debate over the jury went properly to the quality of its
performance, to its competence for its task. More recently, however,
the debate has tended to go off on other issues. First, there has been
the concern with court congestion and the civil jury's contribution to
it. Second, there has been the resurgence of interest in auto compensation plans which would effect a major reform of substantive law
and, as an incidental by-product, abandon the jury, thus reducing
enormously the civil jury's domain.
These are both arresting and complex topics, but I submit that they
are largely irrelevant, and should like at the outset to clear them from
the path of discussion of the basic issue: the value of the jury as an
institution for adjudication.5
The point is perhaps clearest with respect to the compensation plan.6
When one speaks in this context of the merits of the jury trial in personal injury cases, the objection is usually not to the jury trial as a
distinctive mode of trial but to the common-law systems of negligence
and damages. The reform is aimed not at the jury, but at the substantive criteria for determining what compensation, if any, accident
victims are to receive. The serious arguments for substantive change
would remain the same had the jury never been involved in these
cases. The target of reform is the uneven incidence of common-law
compensation. Further, the hope of such proposals is not simply to do
away with jury trials but to make any trial unnecessary. In varying
ways all plans envisage a relatively automatic paying of insurance claims,
and so simplify the criteria for recovery as greatly to reduce the likelihood of contested cases. Basically, therefore, such proposals are no
more relevant to debate over the merits of the jury system than would
be a scheme for reducing or eliminating auto accidents themselves.
There is, however, one noteworthy detail here. Despite the fact
that one could have a plan which retained jury trial for whatever few
controversies were not disposed of by negotiation, all plans appear to
transfer such residual controversy into administrative channels. Although the point receives notably little discussion in the various pro5. I shall also skip another familiar topic in the modern jury debate-the painless
disappearance of the civil jury in England. While this may be high evidence that a
civilized people can give up the civil jury and remain civilized, this surrender of the
jury is not a strong precedent for the debate because of differences between the English
and American jury trial situations.
6. See Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto
Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 641, 714 (1964).
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posals, there are perhaps several reasons for this. But, in any event,
if respect for administrative expertise is a reason for thus disposing of
residual cases it is worth noting that the case for establishing an administrative agency seems upside down here. Both the liability issue and
the damages issue would, under a plan, be substantially simpler than
those which are now, at common law, left to the jury. The plans
thus appear to be following the curious sequence of first simplifying
the issues and then shifting them to an allegedly more expert tribunal.
It is possible, however, to take an exactly opposite view of the matter;
namely, that the jury with its common sense and feel of the community
is the "expert" tribunal for the two great distinctive issues posed by
the common law: drawing the profile of negligence and handling the
individual pricing of damages. Perhaps the reason compensation plans
have so readily surrendered the jury is that the distinctive strengths of
the jury are no longer required.
The concern over court congestion is not quite so easily dismissed.
It is fashionable today to complain that the time costs of the jury trial
have made it a luxury that hard-pressed urban court systems can no
longer afford. Here, fortunately, our researches have advanced to the
stage of publication, and in our volume, Delay in the Court7 Hans
Zeisel, Bernard Buchholz, and I made a careful analysis of the jury's
role in causing delay. Our study was confined to a single court
system, the Supreme Court of New York County (Manhattan), but
the analysis was broad enough to make it relevant to the problem of
court delay generally. Several points, more fully developed in the
book, may be usefully recapitulated here.
Jury trials can contribute to delay only if it takes longer to try a
case to a jury than to try the same case to a judge alone.8 The point,
therefore, must be: If all cases now tried to juries were tried to judges,
there would be a sufficient saving of trial time to make a significant
contribution to the reduction of backlog and the elimination of delay.
Thus, jury trial can be said to "cause" delay only in the special sense
that the failure to use a remedy can be said to cause the continuation
of a disease. Use of the jury is a cause of delay only in the sense that
use of the combined trial of liability and damage issues or the exclusive
7. ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ,
Dmk.Y iN THm CoURr].

D-.mAY IN THE COURT

(1959)

[hereinafter cited as

8. See id. at 71; Zeisel, The Jury and the Court Delay, Annals, March 1960, p. 46.
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reliance on adversary medical experts-rather than split trials or impartial medical experts-is a cause of delay. 9
Confusion about the role of the jury and its effect on delay was
deepened in the New York court by the fact that four separate trial
calendars were employed: 10 general bench trials, general jury trials,
personal injury bench trials, and personal injury jury trials. Further,
the New York practice was to grant a wholesale preference to cases
on the first three calendars. The result, of course, was that only the
personal injury jury calendar was delayed; and this was often taken as
evidence that the personal injury jury trial was the cause of the delay.
The thirty-nine-month delay figure credited to the personal injury jury
trial at the time of our study was simply a consequence of the calendar
arrangement; if cases with blond and brunette plaintiffs had been given
automatic preferences in the same way, it would have appeared by the
same logic that red-headed plaintiffs were the cause of the delay. Indeed,
we estimated that had New York given up its preference scheme the
average delay would have dropped to ten months.
We return then, to the central point: How much longer is a jury
trial than a bench trial? Estimates by experienced judges and lawyers
have varied widely; and it is surprisingly difficult to arrive at a satisfactory answer since we cannot try the same case by each method with
a stopwatch in hand. Further, since there is good reason to believe
that cases tried to a jury are in many respects different and more complex than cases in which a jury is waived, we cannot arrive at an answer
simply by comparing a sample of jury trials and a sample of bench
trials. We were fairly successful in extricating ourselves from this
methodological impasse. By using a series of estimates," we reached
the conclusion that on the average a bench trial would be 40 per cent
less time consuming than a jury trial of the same case. As far as I
know, this 40 per cent figure remains the best estimate of the time
savings.' 2
9. See DELAY IN THE COURT ch. 11; Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving;
A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 1606 (1963).
10. DELAY IN Tr COURT 7, 29, 200, 271.
11. In brief, we controlled the number of witnesses and used, in addition to
statistical comparison, estimates derived from two surveys-one of trial judges and one
of trial lawyers. See DELAY IN ThM COURT 75-78.
12. Judge David Peck in a widely publicized estimate has said that a jury trial takes
22 times as long as a bench trial. In fairness, however, this is not as different from
our 40% estimate as it may seem at first since the base is not the same. In our estimate
the length of the jury trial is used as the base and in Judge Peck's estimate the length
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The 40 per cent time cost is, to be sure, not trivial, and it will be
weighed differently depending on one's view of the jury otherwise.
However, this estimate, standing alone, does little to advance the discussion, regardless of its accuracy. A chief point of our study was to
relate the impact on delay of abolishing the jury to the impact on
delay of other remedies that were not being urged and thus to attempt
to obtain a "price tag" for the civil jury system.
There are four alternative "remedies" to be compared with abolition
of the jury:
(1) The New York court at the time of our survey had a total of
twenty-six judges, nineteen of whom were sitting in the law division. It
was our estimate that abolition of the jury in personal injury cases
would have the same impact on court congestion as the appointment
of 1.6 judges.' 3 The New York court is not in all respects typical,
and the savings would be somewhat larger in many other courts. We
would suggest, however, that before the jury is sacrificed on behalf of
court congestion, a serious estimate be made of how many additional
judges would be required to have the same impact on that delay.
(2) The second alternate remedy is more dramatic. In 1956 New
York had experimented with a summer session as a way of increasing
judicial manpower without adding judgeships. In effect the plan required that each judge surrender just two weeks of a three-month summer vacation. This scheme was abandoned after a one-year trial, due
as much, perhaps, to the irritation of the trial bar as to that of the
trial bench. However, we estimated that had New York continued
with the summer session plan, the impact on delay would have been the
same as the savings from
same as that of 1.5 additional judges-or the
4
abolition of the personal injury jury trial.'
(3) A few years ago the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois initiated use of the split trial-that is, separate trials
of the liability and the damage issues. My colleagues, Hans Zeisel
and Thomas Callahan, have made a careful study of the first two
years of experience under the rule and conclude that its full use would
save approximately 20 per cent of current trial time-or about half
the saving to be expected from abolition of the jury."
These three comparisons make the 40 per cent estimate more meanof the bench trial is used as the base. The parallel statement of our estimate would
be that the jury trial is 1 i times as long as the bench trial.

13. See

DELAY iN Tm COURT 82.

14. See Id. at 176.
15. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 9.
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ingful and converge on a conclusion: If the case against the jury is
that its abolition is to be considered a remedy for court congestion,
then the proper topic is court congestion and what else can be done
about it. When the price tag for the jury system is, as in New York,
the appointment of 1.6 new judges, or the curtailing of summer vacations by two weeks per judge, or vigorous use of other remedies such
as split trials, it seems that the jury is being sold for too low a price.
In any event, responsible discussion of the jury's contribution to delay
must confront these facts.
(4) There is a fourth set of figures that should be considered. We
were able to compare a sample of New Jersey personal injury jury
trial cases with a sample of New York personal injury jury trial cases;16
the two samples were made roughly comparable. Analysis showed that
the New Jersey cases, on the average, were being tried 40 per cent
faster than the New York cases. Analysis of a sample of trial transcripts, etc., was not very successful in unlocking the secret of New
Jersey's speed, but the data strongly suggested that it is feasible to
speed up the jury trial. It is arresting, indeed, that the time margin
of New Jersey jury trials over New York jury trials is about equal
to that of the New York bench trials over the New York jury trials, or
the amount of time hoped to be saved by abolishing the jury.
The 40 per cent figure does not, to my mind, make out a persuasive
case against the jury on grounds of court congestion alone. And there
is a further point of some generality. It can well be argued that reduction of delay is a poor ad hoc reason for tampering with the jury system
in any event.1" It is important that the pressures generated by the very
real and stubborn problems of court congestion not be dealt with in a
fashion which might permanently affect the quality of our justice.
Delay is not a sufficient reason for altering the jury apart from consideration of the quality of the jury as an adjudicator. At most delay
is an additional straw in the calculus of those already dissatisfied with
the performance of the jury-and, as the New York study shows, the
straw is not a very heavy one.
II
We are ready, then, for the proper issue about the jury: the quality
of its performance.
16. See DELAY IN TrHE CouRT 94.
17. See Zeisel, supra note 8, at 52.
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As we come to the merits of the institution, it may be useful to
sketch three main heads under which criticism and defense of the jury
have fallen.
First, there is a series of collateral advantages and disadvantages such
as the fact that the jury provides an important civic experience for the
citizen; that, because of popular participation the jury makes tolerable
the stringency of certain decisions; or that because of its transient personnel the jury acts as a lightning rod for animosity and suspicion
which might otherwise center on the more exposed judge; or that the
jury is a guarantor of integrity since it is said to be more difficult to
reach twelve men than one. On the negative side it is urged that jury
fees are an added expense to the administration of justice; that jury
service often imposes an unfair economic and social burden on those
forced to serve; and that exposure to jury service disenchants the citizen
and leads him to lose confidence in the administration of justice.
Although many of these considerations loom large in the tradition
of jury debate, they are unamenable to research and will not concern
us here. We have, however, collected considerable data bearing on
the reaction of jurors to service. It will suffice for present purposes
simply to state that there is much evidence that most people, once actually
serving in a trial, become highly serious and responsible toward their
task and toward the joint effort to deliberate through to a verdict.
Whether they are good at the job may be open to question, but that
they are serious about it and give it a real try is abundantly documentable. Anecdotes about jury frivolity and irresponsibility are almost
always false. Further, we can document that jury service does not disenchant, but actually increases the public's preference for trial by jury.
A distinction must be made between the attitude of those who have
never served and seek to avoid service and the response of the juror once
he has been "drafted," so to speak. Finally, the things jurors do not
like about the system are quite extrinsic housekeeping defects which
can and should be corrected, such as the waiting, the loss of income
due to serving, and the often miserable quarters in which they are
kept. The heart of the matter, the trial itself and the deliberation, is
very often a major and moving experience in the life of the citizen-juror.
The second cluster of issues goes to the competence of the jury. Can
it follow and remember the presentation of the facts and weigh the
conflicting evidence? Can it follow and remember the law? Can it
deliberate effectively?
The third cluster of issues goes to the adherence of the jury to the
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law, to what its admirers call its sense of equity and what its detractors
view as its taste for anarchy.
The latter two issues go to the heart of the debate and have long
been the occasion for a heated exchange of proverbs. Further, they may
seem so heavily enmeshed in difficult value judgments as to make further
discussion unpromising. Yet it is precisely here that our empirical studies
can offer some insight, although they too cannot dispose fully of the
issues.
When one asserts that jury adjudication is of low quality, he must
be asserting that jury decisions vary in some significant degree from
those a judge would have made in the same cases. If he denies this
and wishes to include the judge, he has lost any baseline, and with it
any force, for his criticism. While it is possible to say that even those
juries whose decision patterns coincide with those of judges are nevertheless given to caprice, lack of understanding, and sheer anarchic disobedience to law, it is not likely that the critic means to go this far.
If he does, he may have an interesting point to make about the legal order
as a whole, but he has lost any distinctive point about the jury as a
mode of trial. Further, trial by judge is the relevant and obvious alternative to trial by jury. To argue against jury trial is, therefore, to argue
for bench trial.
Can one say anything, then, about how often judge and jury decisions agree and how often they differ? We can. One of our major
research ventures has been a massive survey of trial judges on a nationwide basis. With their cooperation we were able to obtain reports on
actual cases tried to a jury before them, to get the jury's verdict in each
case, and to get from the judge a statement of how he would have decided
the case had it been tried to him alone. Finally, the trial judge gave us
his explanation of any instance of disagreement. We have, in this fashion,
collected from some 600 judges, reports on some 8,000 jury trials
throughout the United States for each of which we have an actual
jury verdict and a hypothetical verdict from the bench. Ve are just
completing a full, book-length, analysis of the picture thus obtained
for criminal cases and plan in the ensuing year to complete the companion book reporting on the civil cases.ls The methodological details
about the sample, about the reality and accuracy of the judges' responses, and about the logic by which we infer explanations for the disagreements must be left to the book presentation.'0 We are satisfied that
18. See note 3 supra.
19. Some preliminary remarks about the methodological problems involved are found
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the methods were sound and that we have developed an effective tool
for studying the nature of the jury's performance.
While there are rich nuances in the patterns of jury disagreement that
cannot be detailed here, we can report the main findings and place the
jury system against the baseline of the bench trial system, thus giving
an empirical measure of the quality of the jury performance. We shall
do so first for criminal cases and then for civil cases; the contrast may
help to put the performance of the civil jury in perspective.
It is evident that the matching of verdicts in criminal cases yields four
possible combinations: cases where judge and jury agree to convict,
where they agree to acquit, where the judge would acquit and the jury
convict, and where the jury would acquit and the judge convict. Hence,
the quantitative results can be readily summarized in a fourfold table.
Table 1 gives the data on the criminal cases.
Table 1
Judge and Jury Agreement and Disagreement
20
on Guilt in Criminal Cases
Jury Found:
Against
For
Defendant
Defendant

Judge Would
Have Found:
For Defendant
Against Defendant
Total Jury

Total
Judge

13
18

2
67

15
85

31

69

100

The table contains two main conclusions. First, the jury and judge
agree in the large majority of cases; to be exact in 13 per cent plus 67
per cent or 80 per cent in all. Second, in the remaining 20 per cent
of the cases, in which they disagree, the disagreement is generally due
to the jury's being more lenient toward the criminal defendant. In
summary, the overall performance of the jury is such as to produce a
high degree of conformity to that of the judge, but with elbow room
left for the jury to perform a distinctive function. Or, as we have put
it on other occasions, the jury agrees with the judge often enough to
be reassuring, yet disagrees often enough to keep it interesting.
in Zeisel, Social Research on the Law: The Ideal and The Practical,in
SociouOGY 124 (Evan ed. 1962).

20. Tables 1 and 2 have been simplified by the omission of hung juries.
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Table 2 gives the companion figures for personal injury cases.
Table 2
Judge and Jury Agreement
on Liability in Personal
Injury Cases- O
Judge Would
Have Found:
For Plaintiff
For Defendant
Total Jury

Jury Found:
For
For
Defendant
Plaintiff

Total
Judge

44
11

10
35

54
46

55

45

100

Again we see that there is massive agreement; in the personal injury
cases it runs 44 per cent plus 35 per cent or 79 per cent, almost exactly
the same as for the criminal cases. Here, however, the pattern of disagreement is much more evenly balanced. The judge disagrees with
the jury because he is more pro-plaintiff about as often as the jury
disagrees with him because it is more pro-plaintiff. Whereas the greater
leniency of the jury toward the criminal defendant is congruent with
popular expectations, the equality of pro-plaintiff response between
judge and jury in civil cases is in sharp contrast to popular expectations.
It must be added that Table 2 does not present quite the whole picture. If we look for the moment simply at the 44 per cent of the cases
where both decide for the plaintiff, we find considerable disagreement
on the level of damages. In roughly 23 per cent the jury gives the
higher award, in 17 per cent the judge gives the higher award and in
the remaining 4 per cent they are in approximate agreement. More
important, however, is the fact that the jury awards average 20 per cent
higher than those of the judge.
The two tables considered together imply that the jury's disagreement with the judge is not a random matter; they indicate something
more interesting about the nature both of judge and jury as decision
makers. The precise quality of that something cannot be properly
sketched here. We have had considerable success in finding explanations for the instances of disagreement and thus in reconstructing a
full and rounded rationale. Our thesis is that it is the jury's sense of
equity, and not its relative competence, that is producing most of the
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disagreement. Thus, debate over the merits of the jury system is in
the end debate over the jury as a means of introducing flexibility and
equity into the legal process.
There are, however, some further observations about the issue of
jury competence. We have been told often enough that the jury trial
is a process whereby twelve inexperienced laymen, who are probably
strangers to each other, are invited to apply law which they will not
understand to facts which they will not get straight and by secret
deliberation arrive at a group decision. We are told also that heroic
feats of learning law, remembering facts,, and running an orderly discussion as a group are called for in every jury trial.2 In the forum of
armchair speculation, a forum which on this topic has enrolled some
of the most able and distinguished names in law, the jury often loses
the day.
The two basic tables giving the architectural statistics of the jury's
performance vis-a-vis the judge's performance have already indicated
that the armchair indictment of the jury must go awry somewhere. We
can, however, in a variety of ways document more securely our assertion that intellectual incompetence or sheer misunderstanding of the
case is not a problem with the jury.
In the judge-jury survey the trial judge, among other things, classified each case as to whether it was "difficult to understand" or "easy."
We can therefore spell out the following hypothesis to test against the
judge-jury data. If the jury has a propensity not to understand, that
propensity should be more evident in the cases rated by the judges as
difficult than in those rated as easy. 22 Further, disagreement should be
higher in cases which the jury does not understand than in cases which
they do understand since, where the jury misunderstands the case, it
must be deciding on a different basis than the judge. We reach, then,
the decisive hypothesis to test, namely, that the jury should disagree
more often with the judge in difficult cases than in easy ones. However, when we compare the decision patterns in easy cases with those
in difficult cases we find that the level of disagreement remains the
23
same.
This rather intricate proof is corroborated by the fact that although
21. For varying expressions of this view see FRANK, COURTS ON TRiUL (1949); Green,
Juries and Justice-The Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 152;
Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920).
22. It might be noted that some 85% of the cases were rated by the judges as falling
in the "easy" category.
23. The data here discussed come from the study of criminal cases; there is no reason
to believe the point will not hold for civil trials as well.
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the trial judges polled gave a wide variety of explanations for the cases
in which there was disagreement, they virtually never offered the
jury's inability to understand the case as a reason.
Any mystery as to why the plausible a priorisurmises of jury incompetence should prove so wrong is considerably reduced when we take a
closer look at the dynamics of the jury process, a look we have been able
to take as a result of intensive and extensive post-trial juror interviews
in actual cases and as a result of complete observation of jury deliberations in mock experimental cases, a technique used widely in the project. '4 We observed that the trial had structured the communication to
the jury far more than the usual comment recognizes and had made
certain points quite salient. A more important point is that the jury can
operate by collective recall. Different jurors remember, and make available to all, different items of the trial so that the jury as a group remembers far more than most of its members could as individuals. It
tends, in this connection, to be as strong as its strongest link. The
conclusion, therefore, is that the jury understands well enough for its
purposes and that its intellectual incompetence has been vastly exaggerated.
Often in the debate over the jury the capacity of one layman is compared to the capacity of one judge, as though this were the issue. The
distinctive strength and safeguard of the jury system is that the jury
operates as a group. Whether twelve lay heads are better than one
judicial head is still open to argument, but it should be recognized that
twelve lay heads are very probably better than one.
It has been a major characteristic of debate over the jury that its
critics are quick to announce at the outset that they are talking only of
civil juries-their argument is not meant to impeach juries in criminal
cases. The view I have been developing in this paper sees the jury as
an adjudicating institution with certain basic characteristics and qualities
which would be relatively constant as its business moves from civil to
criminal cases. The question I wish to explore for a moment is the
logic by which one would abolish the civil jury and cherish the criminal
jury.2 I recognize, of course, that as a practical matter there are great
24. The experimental jury technique was developed for the project by Fred L.
Strodtbeck and some aspects of the method are discussed in Strodtbeck, Social Process,
the Law and Jury Functioning, in LAW AND SocioLoGy 144 (Evan ed. 1962). The
forthcoming volume, Sim.oN, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANrry (see note 3 supra)

will be the first full length publication of the results of a jury experimental sequence.
25. Consider, for example, the conclusion of the careful essay on the civil jury by
Milton Green:
(T)he defects appear to be nonremediable. To be a jury, within constitutional

HeinOnline -- 50 Va. L. Rev. 1067 1964

1068

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 50:1055

differences here in terms of both constitutional requirements and popular reaction. I wish, however, to look theoretically at this matter. If
the jury operates in a civil case as its critics say, can one justify retaining
such an archaic and incompetent institution in criminal cases?
Dean Griswold, for example, has recently observed:
But jury trial, at best, is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should
anyone think that twelve persons brought in from the street, selected in
various ways, for their lack of general ability, should have any special
26
capacity for deciding controversies between persons?
Dean Griswold was arguing for the abolition of the jury in civil cases.
Is there not an obligation to try this biting premise on the criminal jury
as well? For these grave and important controversies the jury should
not be any abler; it must still be "the apotheosis of the amateur" and
the twelve men must still be "selected in various ways for their lack of
general ability."
The answer to all this, of course, is likely to be that we favor the
jury in criminal cases as a safeguard for the accused, and that we need
no corresponding safeguard in the civil case. There are two things to
note about this line of reasoning, however. First, it would seem to be
waiving any objections about the jury's incompetence and resting the
case on the jury's sense of equity. Second, since it recognizes that introducing equity into the legal scheme is a characteristic of the jury, is
there sufficient basis for applauding the jury's brand of equity in criminal
cases while being critical of it in civil cases?
III
The discussion thus far has been regrettably general and colorless and
removed from the particular issue or the particular case. I should like
definitions, it must be a fair cross-section of the community. As such it will never
be a competent fact-finder, and it will never be able to make an intelligent application of the law to the facts. The inescapable conclusion is that, in the interest
of dispatch and justice, the jury should be abolished.
It may be argued that this is all very well in theory, but the public will never
stand for it. It would take a constitutional amendment to eliminate the jury and
the people will not give it up. I would readily agree if we were talking about
eliminating the jury in criminal cases, and the people would be right. It is quite
another matter to ask the public to give up the jury in civil cases, to ask people
to give up an irksome chore which they frequently seek to avoid. . . . Average
citizens may be inept as fact-finders and law-appliers, but they generally have good
common sense and are able to recognize an important public need created by
the changing pace of our time.
Green, supra note 21, at 166-67.
26. 1962-63 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN'S REP. 5-6.
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to try to compensate a bit for this abstractness by pausing to explore
one pocket of "jury law" as an example of the human flavor of the
jury process and of the ambivalence of the legal system toward the
jury's precise function. The topic is the jury's handling of counsel
fees in the personal injury case.
I begin with an anecdote that comes, not from our study, but from
a bar meeting I attended a few years ago. It seems a lawyer chanced
to overhear a jury deliberating in a personal injury case. They had
agreed on liability and were moving to the issue of damages. Their
first step was to agree on a fee for the plaintiff's lawyer. They then
proceeded to multiply it by three to get the damages!
Vhat do the materials from our study do to the picture of the jury
suggested by this story? To begin with we might note some points
about the law within this area. Under American law counsel fees are
not to be awarded as part of the plaintiff's damages. This rule, although
clear, embodies a controversial policy which is not uniformly followed
in other legal systems.2 8 Second, the jury normally is not instructed
about fees; that is, they are not told they are not to award them. The
theory is that it is enough to explain the heads under which damages
are to be awarded and that it would be dangerous to mention the fee
problem for fear that the negative instruction might boomerang. Fees
along with taxes and interest are therefore instances of what may be
called "silent" instructions. -9
XVhat then does the jury do about fees? It is curiously difficult to
come to a firm conclusion, but the data run about as follows. The
jurors often discuss fees in the course of deliberations and see no impropriety in so doing. They are frequently but not invariably well
informed about the one-third contingent fee contract. Do they then
add the fee? We are inclined to conclude not. It is more that fees
provide a useful talking point in the deliberations over damages, functioning as a device in argument to facilitate agreement. And the salience
of fees in the discussion appears to vary inversely with the clarity of
the damage measurement. Thus, in a series of property damage cases
where the damages had objective referents, the jury did not discuss
fees. Furthermore, we never found a jury determining the damage
total and then as a group deciding on the fee and adding it.
27. See generally Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage
Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158, 163, 176 (1958).
28. See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 71 (1935); DELAY IN THE COURT 290.
29. See GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRm 464-76 (1959).
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I shall conclude this brief sketch with an anecdote that does come
from our own files. In one of the experimental jury deliberations there
was a sharp split in the jury over the damages. The majority faction
favored 35,000 dollars and the minority 25,000 dollars and after considerable discussion the impasse seemed firm. Finally, one of the majority raised the fee issue for the first time and reminded the holdouts that
the plaintiff would have to pay his lawyer. The holdouts agreed that
this was a point they had not previously considered and yielded rather
rapidly. An overly logical member of the majority then raised the
point that in reaching their figure of 35,000 dollars they had not considered fees either. He was summarily silenced by the other majority
jurors, and a verdict of 35,000 dollars was unanimously agreed upon!
The anecdote has echoes at the appellate court level. In Renuart
Lumber Yards, Inc. v. Levine," a relatively recent Florida case, the
court found an award of 75,000 dollars excessive, estimated that some
30,000 dollars must have been for pain and suffering, and ordered a
remittitur. Judge Hobson in dissent argued that for this purpose the
court should consider the facts of life as to fees. He said:
iMoreover, although there is no legal basis for the inclusion of an
attorney's fee in the judgment it is a matter of common knowledge
that in personal injury actions lawyers do not customarily perform
services for the plaintiff gratuitously. As a practical proposition it is
indeed probable that after paying for the services of his attorney
appellee would have little, if any, of the $30,000 left ....

Such cir-

cumstance cannot be ignored by the writer in performing his part of
this Appellate Court's duty to determine whether the judgment is so

grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience.3 1
Presumably Judge Hobson would have held it error for the jury to
be instructed to consider fees. Yet he feels it appropriate to consider
them himself for the special purpose of resolving the issue before him.
We are tempted to say that the jury, insofar as we can tell, treats fees
much the same as the judge did-not as simply additive but as an acceptable reason for not rejecting a given award as excessive.
Finally, I suspect the law likes the fee rule the way it is. The fee
question as an explicit issue of policy is difficult to resolve. Since we
cannot decide what we want to do about fees as damages, we are happy
to let the whole troublesome issue go to the jury. The jury's performance with respect to counsel fees can be read as furnishing both
30. 49 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1950).
31. Id. at 102.
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an argument for the civil jury and an argument against it. My immediate point in reviewing it was not so much to sharpen the debate
as to give some indication of how complex jury decision-making be32
havior is.
It has been a traditional point of argument against the jury that it
ameliorated the harsh rules of law just enough to dampen any enthusiasm or momentum toward proper reform. And the fee example
may support this. It is easy to say that a rule of law is either sound
or unsound. If it is sound it should be enforced as written; if it is
unsound it should be changed by proper process. This logical scheme,
however, seems to me too rigid. Reform of private law is notoriously
hard to effectuate, and in the long interim there is room for the jury's
touch. Further, there is not inconsiderable evidence that jury resistance
to a rule is often a catalyst of change. 33 Finally, and perhaps most
important, we have a sense that many of the jury's most interesting
deviations would be exceedingly hard to codify and incorporate by
rule.
The content of jury equity in civil cases is obviously a topic of high
interest, and we have not yet documented it fully in our studies. There
are, however, three or four major points to be at least noted here. First,
as has been long recognized, 34 in certain areas of law jury equity is
fully legitimated by the system. Here, it is not what we suspect the
jury may do in bending the law; it is what the jury is instructed to do
according to the official view. For example, in defamation it is the
jury's official task to define the content of the defamatory standard,
and in negligence cases its task is to define negligence for the particular
conduct involved. 35 Although I realize that history and comparative
32. The difference between the two anecdotes about fees can be taken as the
difference between the lore of the bench and bar and the systematic empirical study
of the behavior. In a sense the systematic study of the jury simply rediscovers
truths that the bar has long known; but I would hasten to add that when so
rediscovered the bar's "truths" appear to be half-truths.
33. See, e.g., Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So. 2d 541 (1951), where the court,
in explicitly changing its rule as to the allowance of damages for humiliation from
scars, recognized the jury's refusal to follow the old rule.
34. See HoLMEs, Tim Co MoN LAw 98-103 (Howe ed. 1963).
35. This familiar point as to negligence is made fully explicit in the new standard
jury instructions made mandatory in Illinois by ILL Sup. CT. R. 25-1:
W~hen I use the word negligence in these instructions, I mean the failure to do
something which a reasonably careful person would do or the doing of something
which a reasonably careful person would not do under the circumstances similar
to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful
person would act under these circunstances; that is for you to decide.
ILLINOIS PATMRIN JURY INsmucrioNs 10.1 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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law are against the notion, I cannot but wonder whether a negligence
criterion would have developed without the jury-and whether it can
make any real sense without a jury.
Second, there are three big points of jury equity on which our research may alter the popular view. The jury does not simply ignore
the contributory negligence rule and apply a comparative negligence
formula of its own; this view, popular among torts professors, is at
most a half-truth, and the less interesting half at that.
Again, it is perhaps evident from Table 2 that the jury has not, in
keeping with the mood of the day, silently revolutionized the basis of
36
liability so that today we have in effect a strict liability system.
Finally, the jury in personal injury cases has perhaps radically altered
the official doctrine on computing damages; it tends to price the injury
as a whole in a fashion analogous to the use of general damages in
defamation.
And as a final teaser it should be recalled that the jury, as Table 2
warns, is not monolithically pro-plaintiff in personal injury cases. The
thesis here is complex and centers on the distribution of the equities visa-vis the existing legal rules. The jury tends to follow the equities,
in a very loose and rough sense, and the law has not uniformly deprived
the plaintiff of them. The jury's response to collateral benefits, to
imputed negligence, and, on occasion, to the use of criminal statutes to
establish negligence may be quickly cited as instances of what we have
in mind here.
In the end, then, debate about the merits of the jury system should
center far more on the value and propriety of the jury's sense of
equity, of its modest war with the law, than on its sheer competence.
Criticism of the jury raises a deep, durable, and perplexing jurisprudential issue, and not a simple one of the professional engineer versus
the amateur.
IV
On most issues of policy one may question the relevance of an opinion poll as an aid to forming his own opinion. In the case of the jury,
however, an opinion poll may have extra force. In any event, the final
item of data I wish to report is a survey we conducted among a national
sample of trial judges as to their opinions of, and attitudes toward, the
36. See Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto
Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 641, 648 (1964).

37. See Kalven, supra note 27.
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jury system. The trial judge's views as to the value of the jury are
especially entitled to respectful hearing: he is the daily observer of
the jury system in action, its daily partner in the administration of
justice, and the one who would be most affected if the civil jury were
abolished.
The questionnaire was elaborate and reflected a series of specific
points about which we had become concerned during the life of the
project. When reported in full, it should yield a rounded profile of
contemporary judicial attitudes toward the jury and toward specific
reforms that might increase its usefulness. At the moment we shall
rest with reporting two basic tables. The judges were asked to choose
among three positions on the jury for criminal, and then for civil trials:
(1) On balance the jury system is thoroughly satisfactory.
(2) The jury system has serious disadvantages which could
be corrected and should be corrected if the system is to remain
useful.
(3) The disadvantages of the jury system outweigh its advantages so much that its use should be sharply curtailed.
There were some 1,060 trial judges in the national sample. Table 3
gives the results for criminal cases and Table 4 for civil cases.
Table 3
Trial Judges' Opinions of Jury-Criminal Cases
Number
Per Cent
(1) Thoroughly Satisfactory ..............
791
77
(2) Satisfactory if Certain Changes ......... 210
20
(3) Unsatisfactory .......................
29
3
1,030
Table 4
Trial Judges' Opinions of Jury-Civil Cases
Number
(1) Thoroughly Satisfactory .............. 661
(2) Satisfactory if Certain Changes ..........
280
(3) Unsatisfactory .......................
97
1,038
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The tables require little comment. It is evident that the trial judges
are overwhelmingly against sharp curtailment of the jury; that a substantial majority find the jury thoroughly satisfactory; and that this
support for the jury does not decline appreciably as we shift from
criminal to civil cases. 38
V
As the second alternative offered the judges in our opinion poll suggests, it has been a strong tradition in the jury debate for one group of
its supporters to specify certain reforms of the jury which would then
make it a satisfactory institution. I have said nothing thus far about
reforms and deliberately elect not to do so. It is not that the jury
system could not conceivably be improved; nor is it that all of the
specific reforms suggested are unsound. It is, rather, that the debate
is over the basic architecture of a jury trial system and the basic
architecture of a bench trial system. 39
I am therefore not discussing such matters as: improving the administration of jury selection systems; having the judge do the voir dire
questioning; standardizing jury instructions; summation of the evidence
by the judge; comment on the evidence by the judge; use of vigorous
pretrial procedures to narrow issues; whether the jury is instructed
before or after the closing arguments; written versus oral instructions;
special verdicts; impartial medical experts; reducing the size of the
jury; eliminating the unanimity requirement; or permitting the jurors
to take notes. These measures have a considerable literature in their
own right and appear to constitute a good part of what is currently
called judicial administration.40 In varying degrees our studies have
given us data and views on virtually all of these measures. Some of the
measures are ill-advised, in my view, some are trivial, and some would
be definite improvements. But the case for the civil jury does not, I
think, stand or fall on the adoption of any one or any combination of
them.
Sometimes I suspect that the jury issue will go to whichever side
does not have the burden of proof. And in the forum of policy debate
38. Another poll of judges on their attitudes toward the jury system which also finds
widespread support for the jury system is reported in HART, op. cit. supra note 2, at
4-32.
39. Milton Green would appear to agree that the issue is basic and not conditional
upon specific reforms of the jury; he would therefore resolve it against the jury. See
Green, supra note 21.
40. ELLiorr, IMPROVING OUR COURTS passim (1959).
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the assignment of the burden of proof tends to be a debater's strategy
rather than an accepted convention. Does the argument stand differently
if, on the one hand, the issue is put in terms of introducing the civil
jury into a system that does not have it or perhaps extending it to areas
where we do not have it today, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act,
than it does if, on the other hand, the issue is whether we should abolish
the jury in areas where we do now have it? I think it does, and I incline
41
toward the view that old institutions should not be changed lightly.
We lack, I feel, fresh arguments against the civil jury, apart perhaps
from delay. I cannot resist observing that we need to hear a fresher
point than that the civil jury consists of twelve laymen.
Inevitably, debate over an institution as complex and long standing
as the jury will continue to be inviting and will continue to be inconclusive. It should be stressed that it was not the primary purpose of
our project to appraise the jury, but simply to study it. In the course
of the many years of that study it should be clear that I, personally,
have become increasingly impressed with the humanity, strength, sanity,
and responsibility of the jury. I suspect that that is not a proper argument for it, and I profoundly agree that it would be far better to have
our careful studies ready to speak for themselves and give the rounded
picture.

41. Compare T. B. Smith, Civil Jury Trial in Scotland, 50 VA. L. REV. 1076, 1095
(1964).
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